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During World War I1 women and teenage girls in Britak became 
the focus of anxious public attention. Newspaper reporters, social 
workers, clergymen, government officials, members of moral welfare 
and social purity organizations, and writers of letters to the 
editors of local newpapers across the country condemned women and 
girls for actively seeking out sexual adventures with soldiers. 
For example, the March 23, 1943 issue of the Dailv Herald carried 
the headline, 'Good-Time Girls of 14 are Running Wild. Quoting 
Home Office sources, the report blamed a number of factors that 
were to be cited repeatedly in other articles and in letters to the 
editors of local newspapers. The decline in young girls moral 
standards was due to their fathers being in uniform; their mothers 
in war work; the girls ncould get any job they wantedm and earned 
too much money; and young girls simply could not resist "the 
romantic appeal of a uniform. A memorandum from the War Office 
that circulated among other government departments complained of 
the hordes of women who were "accostingn soldiers on London 
streets. The Bishop of Norwich, echoing clergymen from far flung 
parishes, chastised women and girls in "town and village aliken for 
their "casual acquaintancesu with soldiers. He warned, "we are in 
danger of our national character rotting at the root."' 
This seemingly spontaneous outburst of pronouncements about 
sexual morality was certainly not a unique historical occurrance. 
1 
In World War I there was an outcry about the young girls who were 
seen hanging around military bases. They were depicted in the 
press as being unable to resist the allure of men in uniform, and 
like the girls and young women in World War 11, they were accused 
of being sexual predators.' In the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, and continuing into the prewar period, Britain was the 
scene of rampant concern, fuelled by the print media, over white 
slavery, and before that over prostituti~n.~ During the 1830s and 
1840s public commentary periodically focused on working-class 
women's sexual morality which was believed to be endangered as a 
consequence of the npromiscuous mingling of the sexesw in factories 
and mines. 
Analyzing such outbreaks or upsurges of publicly articulated 
apprehension about sexual morality raises a number of perplexing 
questions concerning how to think conceptually about what are 
seemingly recurrent historical events, about questions of cultural 
continuities and discontinuities, and about the nature of moral 
discourses. In this paper I examine how scholars using various 
forms of structuralism have approached such episodes, and explore 
the consequences of using structural analysis for considering 
issues of recurrence and continuity. In the final sections of the 
paper I discuss an alternative, non-structuralist approach to 
cultural analysis and suggest a redefinition of the concept of 
moral discourse. 
An important line of sociological inquiry has viewed such an 
eruption of excessive concern over morality as occurred in World 
War I1 Britain as an instance of ltmoral panic." The term "moral 
panicit originated with British sociologist Jock Young who coined it 
to refer to late 1960s British responses to drug use by youth.6 
It was used in an influential analysis by sociologist Stanley Cohen 
to depict the reactions by the public, the media, and agents of 
social control to the behavior of particular youth groups who 
emerged in mid-1960s Britain.' Cohen argued that the media 
distorted the events in which the youth groups were involved by 
repetitively producing stylized accounts of them, and the police 
responded by over-reacting, ilamplifyingw the deviancy of the youth. 
He suggested that moral panics provide occasions for those in power 
and their agents to extend their reach by elaborating technologies 
of social control. 
Building on Cohenis analysis, Stuart Hall and his colleagues 
used the Gramscian concept of hegemony to analyze a mid 1970s 
"moral panicii over the perceived increase in crime by Afro- 
Caribbean males.8 They argued that "moral panicsii provide 
opportunities for the state to shape public perception that a 
crisis of social order and a breakdown in social control exists, 
thus justifying an expansion of its powers of control and coercion. 
These analyses did not systematically take up the question of 
what makes such incidents episodic or repetitive. Both Cohen and 
the scholars associated with the Center for Cultural Studies 
suggested, however, that they were not unique historicaz events, 
but rather were particular instances of a mbre general phenomenon. 
To make sense of the repetitive character of such historical 
events, they drew on the ideas of Kai Erikson who had argued, 
powerfully, that such outbreaks occurred when communities faced 
moral "boundary crisesSn9 
Erikson used the term "crime wavet1 to refer to what others 
since have called "moral panic." A "crime waven according to 
Erikson refers to "a rash of publicity, a moment of excitement and 
alarm, a feeling that something needs to be done," to combat what 
are perceived to be altered patterns of deviation by members of the 
community. l o  A crime wave is likely to occur "whenever a community 
is confronted by a significant relocation of boundaries ... The 
occasion which triggers this boundary crisis may take several forms 
- -  a realignment of power within the group, for example, or the 
appearance of new adversaries outside it...".'' Implicit in 
Eriksonls ideas is the Durkheimian proposition that moral beliefs 
and norms are integrative --  they bind people together and comprise 
the cultural glue of social order. "Troubled timesn disturb the 
boundaries and Erikson, following Durkheim, conceptualizes crime 
waves or moral panics as ritual responses through which societal 
representatives reassert the moral order by focusing on those 
deviants who are perceived to be transgressing the boundary- 
defining values. 
Eriksonls ideas have been enormously influential. The Center 
for Cultural Studies group, for example, used the "troubling timesn 
hypothesis and Durkheimian-inspired idea of boundary crisis and 
combined it with a Marxian approach in analyzing youth subcultures 
and reactions to them. Resistance Throuuh Rituals, for example, 
suggested that "movements which disturb a society's normative 
eontours mark the inception of troubling times, especially for 
those sections of the population who have made an overwhelming 
commitment to continuation of the status quo."12 The Birmingham 
group defined moral panic as a "spiral in which social groups who 
perceive their world and position as threatened identify a 
'responsible enemyt and emerge as vociferous guardians of 
traditional values."" They maintained that in the 1970s youth 
became both a symptom and a scapegoat of social anxiety wrought by 
social change." 
Mary Douglas whose work, like Eriksont s bears a Durkheimian 
cast, has been particularly influential to historians and 
sociologists attempting to make sense of why moral panics arise and 
why they recur. Order, according to Douglas, depends on the 
conceptual or categorical boundaries that social actors use in 
negotiating their lives. She maintains that culture 
"provides...some basic categories, a positive pattern in which 
ideas and values are tidily ordered ... it has authority, since each 
is induced to assent because of the assent of others."15 Thus, 
she argues, "rituals of purity and impurity create unity in 
experience. . . .By their means, symbolic patterns are worked out and 
publicly displayed. Within these patterns disparate elements are 
related and disparate experience is given meaning.lt16 Pollutions, 
she argues, "are used as analogies for expressing a general view of 
the social order. They are the symbolic expressions of social . 
order and disorder. Thus disturbances within the social order are 
dealt with, in part, symbolically and how they are dealt with is 
determined by a cultural logic - -  a logic belonging to structural 
properties of the cultural system. Social objects come to be 
defined as polluting when the symbolic boundaries defining the 
sacred and pure are transgressed. Disorder then is experienced as 
dangerous, and pollution behavior "is the reaction which condemns 
any object or idea likely to confuse or contradict cherished 
classification. "la 
Sociologist Robert Wuthnow, influenced by Douglas s structural 
approach, maintains that cultural analysis should focus on how 
symbols are related to one another in a formal s.tru~ture.'~ 
Wuthnow asserts that culture creates order through the structured 
relationship among cultural symbols rather than via the meanings 
that people attribute to them. He defines a moral code as "a set of 
cultural elements that define the nature of commitment to a 
particular course of action. n20 Following Douglas, he argues that 
moral codes are composed of cultural elements or symbols that 
express the boundaries through which the social world is ordered 
and social interaction is possible. Boundaries or distinctions 
demarcate the categories through which the social world is ordered 
and social interaction is possible. llUncertaintyll occurs when 
these boundaries blur or shift leading to the likelihood of moral 
crises. A variety of different situations generate uncertainty and 
provide the conditions for the enactment of rituals like witch 
hunts, lynchings, and moral panics that dramatize the moral order. 
Such ideas about boundary crises, symbolic order, and 
troubled times, while appearing to explain why and when moral 
panics occur are problematic. First, and most obviously, they view 
history as composed of two distinct forms of time--troubled and 
untroubled. The scholars who use such approaches do not, however, 
indicate the criteria for distinguishing troubled and untroubled 
times inde~endentlv of whether or not a moral panic occurs, nor do 
they identify the kinds of disordering events that are likely to 
lead to moral panic. 
Second, while as I shall argue later, distinctions and 
boundaries are crucial components of cultural processes, Douglas 
and Wuthnow seem to suggest that symbolic boundaries either 
passively reflect or are instrumental by themselves in creating 
social order. Distinctions and boundaries, however, are actively 
created as people manipulate symbols.21 Moreover, they create 
order not simply because they provide a cognitive map which 
everyone in a society just follows, but because they are the 
outcome of struggles over the power to define--of contests, in 
other words, over symbolic power.22 
Finally, because Wuthnow's framework in particular stresses 
the relationshin between symbols rather than what it is that is 
being symbolized, it cannot address the question of why some moral 
panics focus so obsessively on physical bodies as the symbolic 
representation of the social body and on sexuality as a source of 
social disorder. Structuralist thought isolates "from the content 
of experience a formal set of constitutive elements and 
relationships among the elements. n23 For structuralists like 
Wuthnow, content is determined by form. But then why has the 
physical body so often been the site of social anxiety, and why has 
lack of sexual control been so recurrently imagined as symbolic of 
social decay? 
In Natural Svmbols Douglas argues that cultural structures and 
social relations merge with images of the body.24 The physical 
body, its parts and its functions, symbolically represents the 
social body, and concerns about social order become translated into 
concerns about bodily control. Thus sexuality is a particularly 
compelling metaphor for social disorder. 
Carroll Smith-Rosenberg has made use of Mary Douglas's ideas 
in her powerful analysis of the obsessive public concern over 
masturbation by young men in Jacksonian America.25 Following 
Douglas, Smith Rosenberg maintains that the physical body 
simultaneously symbolizes the social body while its carnal desires 
threaten to disrupt it. "The biological body, transformed by the 
human mind into a cultural construct, undergoes a second 
metamorphosis, emerging as the symbolic representation of the 
social forces that created it.n26 Smith-Rosenberg writes 
"order within the world of symbol' and metaphor, by its 
nature, is invested with power to maintain itself and 
contain the forces of disorder. But disorder also 
possesses its own wild formless power. ... Formlessness 
will appear particularly threatening,when a society, or 
specific groups within that society, experience rapid 
change -- a movement either toward less structure or to 
a new and untried structure. "*' 
She suggests that this was the case in the U.S. as pre-industrial 
commercial capitalism began to decline, and the hierarchically 
ordered and settled world of the 18th century crumbled. 
Significantly, the institutions such as apprenticeship that guided 
male youth in their transition to adulthood declined. Drawing upon 
both Victor Turner's ideas about liminality and Douglas's ideas 
about the dangers of marginal beings, Smith-Rosenberg suggests that 
the dangers inherent in liminality and marginality intersected and 
fused, " in Jacksonian youth ." Unapprenticed men living outside 
of the guidance of both their families and trusted economic 
institutions were perceived to be sexually threatening. Using 
Douglas1 s ideas about the links between the social body and the 
physical body, Smith-Rosenberg suggests that young men and their 
sexual practices became potent symbols of fearful social 
transformation in Jacksonian America and produced the purification 
ritual that took the shape of the Victorian male purity campaign. 
As suggestive as such an analysis is for comprehending the 
symbolic logic that links social and physical bodies, it assumes as 
does Wuthnow, that events or event-sequences such as moral purity 
campaigns, witch-hunts, and moral panics are discrete occurrances 
whose similarities stem from the fact that they were produced by 
similar social conditions and cultural effects - -  social 
transformations that destabilize cultural categories or boundaries. 
Yet, the moral discourses that are produced at different times have 
a long history. They appear to draw upon, recirculate, and 
rearticulate cultural thematics and symbolic linkages that have 
earlier, recurring, and continuing incarnations. 
Discourses about sexual purity, the disorderliness of women, 
and female sexual promiscuity, for example, have a very long 
history, indeed. As Simon Watney has noted in his discussion of 
the media' s handling of the contemporary Aids crisis, "we do not in 
fact witness the unfolding of discontinuous and discrete 'moral 
Rather "in a ceaseless struggle to define supposedly 
universal 'human1 truths" there are continuing ideological 
skirmishes about public representations generally, and over the 
nature and meanings of the human body and its needs and desires in 
particular. '' Thus, Watney understands sexual moral panics as 
phases in on-going ideological struggles over the nature and 
meanings of the human body and its needs and desires. Furthermore, 
if Foucaultls analysis has taught us anything, it has suggested 
that sexuality has been a pervasive subject of discourse in the 
modern eras3' Various institutions and discursive practices have 
been involved both in producing and regulating it. It is useful, 
then, to think about upsurges of public commentary about sexuality 
and/or youth (or drugs, immigrants, crime, etc.) as episodic rather 
than as discrete events. 
According to Webster s dictionary the literary 'meaning of the 
term nepisoden is "a developed situation that is integral to but 
separable from a continuous narrative." An episode has the 
characteristic of being somewhat separate and distinctive, but yet 
is part of an on-going historical process. A structural analysis 
like Wuthnowis, for example, cannot address the question of 
continuities in the content of moral discourses. For his purposes 
what is important is that regardless of their content they work in 
the same way --  to maintain moral boundaries. Rituals or 
expressive symbolic acts, whether they are witch hunts, televised 
moral events, or lynchings are produced by the same causal 
mechanisms. They are socially organized responses to uncertainty 
which results from strains in symbolic boundaries. According to 
Wuthnowis structural analysis of the culture of moral order, the 
similarity between a panic over sexuality in 1942 and one in 1915 
is due to the fact that both are caused by the same underlying 
structural properties, rather than that they share similar 
preoccupations and are a part of the same on-going history. Yet, 
Geoffrey Pearsonis discussion of the periodic bouts of public 
anxiety in Britain about working-class male adolescent 
nhooliganism,n suggests that a "fixed vocabulary of complaint 
rumbles on through ... history almost without interr~ption."'~ 
The work of Jeffrey Alexander focuses precisely on the 
continuities in vocabularies of moral disc~urse.~' Alexander draws 
his inspiration explicitly and directly from "late Durkheimiann 
thought, but in contrast to Wuthnow, he focuses centrally on the 
issue of "meaningn. Like Wuthnow and Smith-Rosenberg he builds on 
the work of Mary Douglas in his attention to semiotic processes. 
He argues that what makes culture a structuring set of practices 
that has an autonomous or independent effect on "actionn is that it 
is composed of sets of symbolic antinomies that have their own 
logic. But he maintains that these binary oppositions are not 
merely formal elements in a semiotic structure. Rather, they are 
particular antinomies that separate ideas and things into the 
sacred and profane, woppositions that are highly charged both 
emotionally and morally. Sacred symbols, he argues, are Ifnot 
simply one side of an abstract dichotomy. They are the focus of 
heightened affect, reflecting the emotional desirability of 
achieving the good.v3q Alexander conceptualizes culture, in other 
words, as a system of symbolic codes that specify Ifthe good and the 
By virtue of its internal semiotic structure, it has 
causal autonomy the possibility of generalizing between 
different historical contexts. Codes affect action because they 
are internalized, and provide the basis for moral imperatives. 
They also nconstitute publicly available resources against which 
the actions of particular individual actors are typified and held 
morally accountable. n36 Furthermore, discourses are 
institutionalized, and it is through their institutional settings 
that they affect the processes of practical social life. 
Alexander and Smith argue, for example, that the discourse of 
civil society, the institutional realm that is centrally concerned 
with moral regulation, is constituted by a unique, historically 
durable set of cultural  code^.^' The discourse of civil society, 
llconstitutes a general grammar from which historically specific 
traditions draw to create particular configurations of meanings, 
ideology and belief. n38 Specific understandings of American civil 
society are organized and elaborated according to this grammar. 
During times of tension, unease, and crisis, they suggest, the 
structure becomes the key foundation of public debate. Alexander 
and Smith illustrate their approach by examining crises and 
scandals in American politics over a 200 year period. Their 
analysis suggests that presidential impeachment rhetoric and 
intense public debates over presidential authority are structured 
by a remarkably unchanging discourse of democratic liberty. It is 
historically durable, they argue, because "there is an underlying 
consensus as to the key symbolic patterns of American civic 
society. l1 39 
There is much to recommend Alexander1 s way of conceptualizing 
- cultural analysis and the discourses of moral regulation. However, 
while Alexander and Smith appear to demonstrate continuity in the 
"discourse of civil society, they do not explain how and why it is 
so enduring except to say that there is an underlying consensus 
about its key symbolic patterns. This is not an explanation since 
they do not reveal how that underlying consensus was created and 
how it is sustained over time. Their argument that culture is an 
autonomous structure that is capable of creating effects gives 
rhetorical power to their argument because it both suggests that 
cultural processes have their own logic that makes the system or 
structure work, and the term "structuren itself creates a sense of 
solidity and consequence. But the idea that this structure is 
historically durable because there is such widespread consensus 
about it is neither directly demonstrated empirically nor is it 
explained theoretically. 
Alexander and Smith maintain that meaning is created by a 
"formal logic of homology and opposition." Although they suggest 
that discourses play a concrete role in defining and regulating 
social practices and structures through their institutional 
settings, and that the formal symbols have referents that are 
"practical, potent, and 'realsIn these referents and institutions 
do not play a role in the creation of meaning. Alexander and 
Smith's structural model, then, disembeds meanings from their 
historical and social contexts. . It is as if the meanings 
associated with civil society move through time without ever being 
affected by the events that take place during it, or by the 
changing discursive contexts that mark the periods in 'which the 
discourse is being reappropriated. 
In this model these abstract codes endure because they are 
part of a "deep structureW.'O They comprise what William Sewell 
Jr. calls, a wcultural schemats --  a set of conventions or scenarios 
for structuring action and allocating resources." Cultural 
schemas have a virtual existence enabling them to be extended to 
new situations when necessary.42 Deep cultural schema are present 
in a variety of different institutional spheres, practices, and 
discourses. They operate as taken-for-granted and relatively 
unconscious assumptions and procedures. Sewell sees language as the 
prime example of a deep structure which operates as a cultural 
schema. 
According to this way of thinking, if a cultural form is 
repetitive and if it is also extensively deployed in numerous 
institutional arenas, it is a deep structure. The cultural schema 
that links women's open expressions of sexuality with social 
disorder and moral decay is certainly one that appears in numerous 
different kinds of discourses, and it is extensively rearticulated 
in different times and places. Thus, by definition it is such a 
deep structure. This formulation, while appealing, because it seems 
to suggest that particular cultural forms endure because they are 
deep, in the end relies on circular reasoning. If a cultural form 
or practice endures, it is deep. It is deep because it i,s part of 
common sense and it is pervasive. It is part of common sense and 
pervasive because it is structured in a particular way. But if all 
cultural forms are structured by antinomies, why are some durable 
and others not? We are forced ta read back from the observation 
that something endures to a theory of structure which deals with 
order rather than continuity. 
The concrete problem that I am trying to explain with these 
theoretical reflections is this: why have women's open expressions 
of sexuality recurrently been linked in public discourse with 
images of societal moral decay and family breakdown? In the end, a 
structural argument doesn't tell us how and why such issues become 
significant at particular times and places, nor does it give us any 
clue as to the particular meanings that are generated when this 
language of morality is expressed. 
Alexander and Smith suggest, in fact, that a conjunctural 
approach is necessary to determine whether the consequence of 
social conflict or strain will be heightened public attention to 
moral questions. 4 3  Such a conjunctural approach would take into 
account the social actors and institutional resources involved, as 
well as other social, political and cultural circumstances. As 
Alexander and Smith argue, "ritual, or 'social drama1 is a 
contingent social development that can come into play only within 
a distinctive conjuncture.. . " ." 
While I think such a conjunctural approach is exactly the 
right way to go, we need to ask how the particular contexts in 
which womenls sexuality becomes intensely important shapes the 
moral discourse and its meanings, and what consequence that shaping 
might have for how cultural formulations ~ontinue.~' TO answer 
such questions we need to abandon the idea that culture can be 
theorized as a fully autonomous system because it is structurally 
organized. We need a more flexible and multi-stranded approach to 
symbolizing, one that begins with the idea that cultural practices 
and patterned social practices are indelibly interwoven. To argue 
that cultural processes have effects that are not reducible to the 
non-semiotic aspects of social practices it is not necessary to 
claim that culturer s internal structure is responsible for creating 
meaning independent of the relations in which the particular 
cultural processes are embedded.46 
The ideas about language by Bakhtin (/Volosinov), the 
Gramscian concept of narticulation,n and Bourdieuls understanding 
of symbolic power together provide ways to understand continuities 
and transformations in moral discourse that allow for a more 
historical view of how culture works than the kinds of 
structuralist models so far considered. For Bakhtin, communicative 
interaction, or what has come to be known as dialogism, is central 
to understanding how language or symbolizing processes have effects 
in the world. A discourse is produced in response to other 
discourses. and it has meaning only in its relation to complex 
networks of meanings. Language, is always language in w rather 
than an abstract system of relations ." In Bakhtin' s view, "verbal 
discourse is a social phenomenon--social throughout its entire 
range and in each and every one of its factors. from the sound 
image to the furthest reaches of abstract meaning.w48 
The very social nature of dialogism means that utterances 
(Bakhtinl s term for variable units of language) are history-laden - 
- are always part of an on-going historical process. As Holquist 
has suggested. an utterance is never in itself originary. Rather 
it is alwavs an answer; it is conditioned by and it in turn 
qualifies the prior utteran~e.'~ This suggests that discourse is 
produced in an unending process of recuperation and transformation. 
As Bakhtin wrote 
The contexts of dialogue are without limit. They extend 
into the deepest past and the most distant future. Even 
meanings born in dialogues of the remotest past ... will 
always be renewed in later dialogue . . . forgotten 
meanings ... will be recalled again at a given moment in 
the dialogue's later course when it will be given new 
life. For nothing is absolutely dead: every meaning will 
someday have its homecoming festival." 
Yet, each recuperation creates something that was not there before- 
-its meanings are the product of a particular conjuncture. '' 
Discourses are embedded in contemporaneous networks of meanings and 
social relationships, with their own histories of transformation, 
that come together in a particular conjuncture and are thereby 
mutually reconfigured. Thus while particular cultural themes may 
be repeated, each repetition has new resonances and produces new 
meanings and effects. 
Although Foucault8s ideas have primarily.been associated with 
the notion of rupture, in fact, his method of archaeology suggests 
a very similar process of reappropriation and transformation. 
Foucault does not dispense with the idea of continuity per se. 
Rather, he is concerned to establish the conditions of existence 
for discursive formations --  regularities that organize different 
kinds of statements, concepts, and themes.'' Discursive formations 
may incorporate themes that have a long history of use, but it is 
their local configuration that is the object of analysis. For 
Foucault an analysis of a discursive formation deals with 
statements "in the density of the accumulation in which they are 
caught up and which nevertheless they never cease to modify, to 
disturb, to overthrow, and sometimes to destroy." 5 3  He suggests 
that when one discursive formulation is substituted for another, 
"it is not that all objects, concepts and theoretical choices 
disappear." Rather, archaeology examines the new rules of 
formation to "describe and analyse phenomena of continuity, return, 
and repetition. Foucault s archaeological method makes 
repetitions and the "uninterruptedn problems for analysis. He 
writes, "for archaeology, the identical and the continuous are not 
what must be found at the end of the analysis; they figure in the 
element of a discursive practice; they too are governed by the 
rules of formation of positivitie~.~~~ 
In her recent npost-coloniallf reading of Foucaultls ideas 
about race, Ann Stoler argues that Foucault does not depict 
different racial discourses as totally distinct; "he identifies not 
the end of one discourse and the emergence of another, but rather 
the refolded surfaces that join the two. n56 Stoler uses the term 
nfoldll to "identify the recursive, recuperative power of discourse 
itself, in a way that highlights how new elements (new planes 1 in 
a prior discourse may surface and take on altered significance as 
they are repositioned in relation to a new discourse with which 
they mesh.I1 '' Stolerls analysis thus highlights a central feature 
of Foucaultian methodology - -  what she identifies as the tension 
between !]rupture and reinscription in the discourse of history and 
the implications of practices predicated on it.n5B 
While Foucault and Bakhtin share a common point of view about 
continuity and transformation although from quite different 
perspectives, Bakhtinl s ideas allow for a more historically dynamic 
understanding of the instability of discursive fonns and meanings 
than do Foucaultis. For Bakhtin, transformation occurs not only 
because of a dialogical process, but because this dialogical 
process takes place in a heterogeneous social world in which people 
elaborate different discourses depending upon their social location 
and the dialogical histories in which they have participated. 
Bakhtin uses the term "heterogl~ssia~~ to conceive of "the world as 
made up of a roiling mass of languages. 1159 Signs also are multi- 
accentual so that the same words can take on different values and 
meanings. 60  These ideas suggest that discourses are elaborated 
within and are a constituent of contested terrains6' 
But how then does a particular discourse become dominant -- 
and how are meanings fixed, however temporarily? How is it 
possible for discourses to produce systematic effects? This is 
where the Gramscian notion of ~artic~lation,~ is particularly 
useful. "Articulationn refers to the complex "set of historical 
practices by which we struggle to produce identity or structural 
unity out of, on top of, complexity, difference, contradicti~n.~~~ 
Laclau and Mouffe, for example, argue that "any discourse is 
constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to 
arrest the flow of difference, to construct a center.n63 Moral 
discourses, therefore, specify a single standard of virtue, while 
denigrating and/or marginalizing alternative practices. 
Morality, in other words, is elaborated in a struggle over 
symbolic power which is ultimately the power to define social 
categories and groups and to establish the legitimate vision of the 
social worlds6' As Pierre Bourdieu suggests, the power that any 
set of social actors has to define categories and identify groups 
depends on social authority acquired in previous struggles, and is, 
therefore, the result of a long process of institutionalizati~n.~~ 
In contemporary society, the media have been primary institutional 
arenas in which moral authority is established and contested. 
The perspective that I have been elaborating here recognizes 
that.there are always diverse beliefs and practices represented in 
a community; always different standards of virtue jostling for 
dominance, and a continuing array of behavioral practices that 
resist and unsettle those standards. Moral discourse intensifies, 
I want to suggest, when establishing unity'or identity has become 
especially important to a community. 
Sociologists have generally thought about moral discourses in 
two ways: as statements of the sacred rules that dictate action, 
and as the evaluative and nonnative categories that organize 
perception and action. 66 In a fruitful shift of emphasis, 
philosopher Richard Rorty, building on the studies of Michael 
Oakeshott and Wilfrid Sellars, suggests that morality is "the voice 
of ourselves as inembers of a community, speakers of a common 
language. w 6 7  This shift of emphasis focuses attention on the 
co~ections'between morality and collective identities. Morality, 
Rorty proposes, is a matter of nwe-intentions,N and the core 
meaning of Himmoral actionn is "the sort of thing we don't do.ll 
An immoral action is, on this account, the sort of thing 
which, if done at all, is done only by animals, or by people 
of other families, tribes, cultures, or historical epochs. If 
done by one of us, or if done repeatedly by one of us, that 
person ceases to be one of 
This way of thinking about morality suggests that periods in which 
there is an outpouring of moral discourse are those in which the 
issue of community identity has become especially significant ; they 
are times when questions about community or national solidarity and 
homogeneity become highly charged. 69 Moral discourse becomes 
especially intensified, I am suggesting, when perceptions of 
difference and diversity are particularly problematic. War is just 
such a time. 
War exaggerates the significance of the nation as a source and 
object of identity. War is an especially critical juncture as 
people in a nation-state are called upon to unify in defense of 
their supposedly common "way of life. During wartime 
propagandists manipulate patriotic sentiment to stimulate loyalty 
and sacrifice and focus public attention on questions such as who 
"wew are and what it is that "wen stand for. It is a time when 
physical bodies and the social body--the national body--are 
threatened on a variety of fronts. War, especially total war, 
transforms the everyday in unparalleled ways as women and men face 
various new and untested opportunities with unforeseen 
consequences. Thus, war's liberating potential threatens the very 
unity that the nation is imagined to represent. Under such 
conditions, and in a society with a long history of constructing 
female sexuality and the pursuit of pleasure as dangerous, women 
who were perceived to be actively seeking out sexual adventures 
might well be defined as subversive. Yet specifically how 
comntunity or national identity becomes linked to women's sexual 
morality, and how these linkages are represented are a product of 
the particular conjuncture --  of the specific contexts in which 
these identities are articulated. 
While war is likely to provoke heightened attention to 
questions of group or national identity, it is not the only social 
condition that might do this. Periods of large-scale immigration 
and urbanization, as well as times when there is widespread social 
and political unrest, may also make the question of "who are wew 
extraordinarily salient. Group and national identities are 
continually being reimagined, and moral discourses are central to 
this process. 
I am suggesting, then, that moral discourses are crucial 
components of imagined unities. As Angela McRobbie has written 
The kind of social issues and political debates which 
were once included an the agendas of moral panic 
theorists as sites of social anxiety, and even of crisis, 
could now be redefined as part of an endless debate about 
who 'we1 are and about what 'our1 national culture is.'O 
In her analysis of moral reform rhetoric, Mariana Valverde 
similarly argues that social purity was central to nation-building 
and state formation in late nineteenth-century English Canada. '' 
She suggests, furthermore, that social purity rhetoric was crucial 
in "the constitution of certain practice-based social 
subjectivities. "'' Valverde concludes that such an approach links 
the study of moral reform to larger theoretical goals "best 
envisaged as a process oriented (not structure-based) model which 
begins with a reflection on how specific social groups are 
organized in social praxis, and on the role of systems of meaning 
in this practical organi~ation.~'~ 
Defining moral discourses as statements of group identity 
suggests that theories of the cultural formation of (group or 
national) identities may offer insights for analyzing Igmoral 
panicsgg. While such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, 
I want to suggest here possible ways of thinking about this. In 
her recent analysis of new right discourse on race and sexuality, 
Anna Marie Smith makes insightful use of Derridals notion of the 
logic of supplementarity and ideas from psychoanalytic theory. 74 
Smith writes about the Thatcherite campaign against homosexuality, 
. . .homophobic discourse is organized not around a fear of 
otherness but around an obsession with otherness. This 
obsession is structured symptomatically: insofar as 
homophobic representations condensed a whole range of 
anxieties onto the queerness signifier, queerness began 
to function as a supplement to Thatcherite discourse. 
Queerness became one of the enemy elements which 
supported the phantasmatic construction of the family as 
the antagonism-free centre of the British nations7' 
In deconstruction, identity is only possible by its contrast with 
what it is not. And since the "what it is notn is essential to 
identity, identity is never unitary--it always depends on the 
margins or what is excluded from it. Lacanian psychoanalytic 
theory suggests additionally that the obsession with the excluded 
or marginal is a product of the impossible desire for wholeness or 
unity. As Smith writes about the discourses of race and 
homophobia, "the exclusion of the demon symptom figures produces 
the order, the consensus, the sense of common purpose which is 
supposed to have been there all along. The exclusion of dangerous 
difference is necessary for the creation of a sense of unity ('our1 
nation, 'our1 shared norm) , yet the inclusion of difference is a 
necessary support for that exclusion.w76 The production of 
identity through a repudiation of the wlowff, has also been 
explored using a quite different theoretical approach by 
Stallybrass and White who suggest, following Barbara Babcock, that 
"what is socially peripheral is often symbolically central."" 
But does this kind of analysis lead us right back to a formal 
analysis that theorizes cultural process as fully autonomous from 
patterned social relations and practices, a theoretical position 
that I have argued places cultural forms outside of history? I 
think not. Rather the particular targets for "outsider status" are 
selected and constructed through complex social and cultural 
processes. Additionally the very language through which they are 
represented as sources of subversion and disorder is rooted in a 
"traditionn of representational practices. As Smith suggests, such 
discourses "should be located genealogically, within the long 
tradition of similar representations of subversive social elements 
and popular anxieties about prostitution, pornography, abortion 
rights, the provision of contraception to persons under the age of 
consent, sex education, various diseases, communist infiltration, 
idgrant populations, crime 'waves1, drug 'crazes1, 'hooligan1 
youths and so on. Furthermore, the specific discourse about 
sexuality as a source of disorder and its relation to group or 
national identity has its own historical specificities and 
resonances. It grows out of what Foucault has identified as the 
modern discursive construction of sexuality as a form of 
power/knowledge, and is related to the emphasis on sexual self- 
control in the creation of the bourgeois self -'s The deployment 
of sexuality in the construction of group and national identity, 
tells a familiar story, in other words, because it has been told 
before. And each retelling, while having a unique historical 
resonance, still repeats the theme that unruly sexuality, however 
it may be defined, threatens social stability. As Ken Plummer has 
suggested, "stories once told become more tellable, more likely to 
assume an autonomy of their own, irrespective of their original 
experience. ... Their significance may lie in the repeated telling 
of the story . . . Yet each retelling in some way has the 
potential to modify the one that preceded it. 
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